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Abstract We consider the problem of the tragedy of commons in cooperative produc-
tion economies, and propose a mechanism to resolve this tragedy, taking into account
that the coordinator cannot perfectly monitor each agent’s labor skill and each agent
may have an incentive to overstate as well as understate his own skill. Even in such a
situation, the mechanism implements the proportional solution (Roemer in Soc Philos
Policy 6:74–92, 1989 and Roemer and Silvestre in J Econ Theory 59:426–444, 1993)
in Nash and strong equilibria when it is played as a normal form game. Moreover,
the mechanism triply implements the solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong
equilibria when it is played as a two-stage extensive form game.
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1 Introduction
The fact that resource allocation under free access to technology results in “overpro-
duction” and inefficient Nash equilibria in cooperative production economies is best
known as the “tragedy of commons”. This paper provides a mechanism that can solve
this tragedy. As a normative solution for the tragedy, we adopt the proportional solution
(Roemer and Silvestre 1993) under joint ownership of the technology, which assigns
Pareto efficient allocations, in which each agent’s output consumption is proportional
to his labor contribution. Then, we construct an incentive-compatible mechanism that
implements the proportional solution.
There are some works on the implementation of the proportional solution, such
as Suh (1995), Yoshihara (1999, 2000a), and Tian (2000), as well as of other social
choice correspondences in production economies.1 However, in most of the literature
on implementation in production economies, a nonnegligible problem of asymmetric
information in the production process appears to be treated as a “black box.” Under
any mechanism, each agent is usually required to provide some information, and
the outcome function assigns an allocation to each profile of agents’ strategies. This
implicitly assumes, in production economies with labor input, that the mechanism
coordinator is authorized to make agents supply their labor hours consistent with the
assigned allocation.2 This is because the original concern of implementation theory
was in regard to adverse selection problems, and such a focus was valid whenever
there was a decentralized resource allocation in exchange economies and/or production
economies with no labor input. However, in production economies with labor input,
this assumption is not realistic.
As an alternative, in this paper we assume that the coordinator is not authorized to
make agents work as he pleases; the coordinator can monitor each agent’s labor hours,
but the coordinator cannot perfectly monitor each agent’s effective labor contribution
measured in efficiency units, since the coordinator is incapable of observing each
agent’s labor skill exercised in the production process. Thus, there may be an incentive
for each agent to overstate or understate his own skill.3 Even under such a more
realistic model of the tragedy of commons, the mechanism proposed in this paper can
implement the solution.
This mechanism is a type of sharing mechanism: each agent can freely supply his
labor hours, and the agent is asked to provide some information about his demand for
1 For example, Hurwicz et al. (1995), Hong (1995), and Tian (1999) for private ownership production eco-
nomies with only private goods, Varian (1994) for production economies with the presence of an externality,
and Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) and Corchón and Puy (2002) for cooperative production economies.
2 Roemer (1989) pointed out this assumption explicitly.
3 Tian (2000) constructed a mechanism that implements the proportional solution even if the coordinator
does not know the agents’ endowment vectors of commodities, under the assumption that agents can-
not overstate their endowments. As Tian (2000) mentioned, such an assumption may be justified when
endowments consist solely of material goods, since the coordinator can require agents to “place the claimed
endowments on the table” (Hurwicz et al. 1995). In our setting where endowments are labor skills, such
a requirement is no longer valid, since the coordinator may not inspect the amount of skills in advance of
production.
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the consumption good and his skill. Then, the outcome function only distributes the
produced output to agents, according to the given information and the record of their
supply of labor hours. In this mechanism, there is no restriction on the strategy spaces
that prohibits agents from understating or overstating their skills. We will demonstrate
that this mechanism triply implements the proportional solution in Nash, strong Nash,
and subgame-perfect equilibria.
The basic model of economies and sharing mechanisms is defined in Sect. 2.
Section 3 provides a sharing mechanism that implements the proportional solution.
Concluding remarks are in Sect. 4. All proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2 The basic model
There are two goods, one of which is an input (labor time) x ∈ R+ to be used to
produce the other good y ∈ R+.4 There is a set N = {1, . . . , n} of agents, where
2 ≤ n < +∞. Each agent i ′s consumption is denoted by zi = (xi , yi ), where xi
denotes his labor time, and yi the amount of the output to be consumed by i . All
agents face a common upper bound of labor time x¯ , where 0 < x¯ < +∞, and so have
the same consumption set Z ≡ [0, x¯] × R+. Each agent i ′s preference is defined on
Z and represented by a utility function ui : Z → R, which is continuous and quasi-
concave on Z , and strictly monotonic (decreasing in labor time and increasing in the
share of output) on ◦Z≡ [0, x¯) × R++.5 We use U to denote the class of such utility
functions. Each agent i also has a labor skill which is represented by a positive real
number si ∈ R++. The universal set of skills for all agents is denoted by S = R++. The
labor skill si ∈ S implies i ′s effective labor supply per hour measured in efficiency
units. Thus, if the agent’s supply of labor time is xi ∈ [0, x¯] and the agent’s skill is
si ∈ S, then si xi ∈ R+ represents the agent’s substantive contribution in labor supply
to production. The production technology is a function f : R+ → R+, which is
continuous, strictly increasing, concave with f (0) = 0. We choose an arbitrary such
production technology function f and keep it fixed in the sequel. Thus, an economy
is a pair of profiles e ≡ (u, s) with u = (ui )i∈N ∈ Un and s = (si )i∈N ∈ Sn . Denote
the class of such economies by E ≡ Un × Sn .
Given s ∈ Sn , an allocation z = (xi , yi )i∈N ∈ Zn is feasible for s if
∑
yi ≤
f (∑ si xi
)
. We denote by Z (s) the set of feasible allocations for s ∈ Sn . An allocation
z = (zi )i∈N ∈ Zn is Pareto efficient for e = (u, s) ∈ E if z ∈ Z (s) and there does
not exist z′ = (z′i
)
i∈N ∈ Z (s) such that for all i ∈ N , ui
(
z′i
) ≥ ui (zi ), and for some




> ui (zi ). The proportional solution (Roemer and Silvestre 1993) is
a correspondence P R : E  Zn such that, for each e = (u, s) ∈ E , P R (e) stands
for the set of all allocations z= (xi , yi )i∈N ∈ Zn which are Pareto efficient for e such
that, for each i ∈ N , yi = si xi∑ s j x j f
(∑
s j x j
)
. An allocation z ∈ Zn is P R-optimal
for e ∈ E if z ∈ P R (e).
4 The symbol R+ denotes the set of non-negative real numbers.
5 The symbol R++ denotes the set of positive real numbers.
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2.1 Sharing mechanisms
We are interested in mechanisms having the property of labor sovereignty
(Kranich 1994; Yoshihara 2000b),6 which says that every agent can choose freely
his own labor time. As such, we focus on the following types of mechanisms. For
each i ∈ N , let his strategy space be Ai ≡ Mi × [0, x¯], with generic element
(mi , xi ). Note that here Mi stands for an abstract general message space as in clas-
sical mechanisms, while the members of [0, x¯], which represent i’s choice of labor
time as part of his observable action, are also considered as a strategic variable for
i . Let A ≡ ×i∈N Ai . Let w ∈ R+ be the total output the coordinator observes
after production. Then, a sharing mechanism is a function g : A × R+ → Rn+
such that for each (m, x) ∈ A and each w ∈ R+, g (m, x, w) = y for some
y ∈ Rn+. A sharing mechanism g is feasible if for each (m, x) ∈ A and each
w ∈ R+, ∑ gi (m, x, w) ≤ w. We denote by G the class of all (feasible sharing)
mechanisms. In the following discussion, we assume that the production technology
function f is known and the total output after production is observable to the coor-
dinator. Thus, for each s ∈ Sn and each x ∈ [0, x¯]n , w = f (∑ s j x j
)
is known to
the coordinator after production, without the true information about s.7 Then, g ∈ G
implies that for each s ∈ Sn and each (m, x) ∈ A, (x, g (m, x, f (∑ s j x j
))) ∈
Z (s). In the following discussion, for each g ∈ G, we simply write a value of g as
g (m, x) instead of g
(
m, x, f (∑ s j x j
))
except for when we define new mechanisms
in G.
Given g ∈ G, a (feasible) sharing game is defined for each economy e ∈ E as a
non-cooperative game (N , A, g, e). Fixing the set of players N and their strategy sets
A, we simply denote a feasible sharing game (N , A, g, e) by (g, e).
Given a profile (m, x) ∈ A, let (m′i , m−i , x ′i , x−i
) ∈ A be another strategy profile
that is obtained by replacing the i-th component (mi , xi ) of (m, x) with (m′i , x ′i ). A pro-
file (m∗, x∗) ∈ A is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of (g, e) if for each i ∈ N
and each (mi , xi ) ∈ Ai , ui
(






∗−i , xi , x∗−i
))
. Let
N E (g, e) denote the set of Nash equilibria of (g, e). An allocation z = (xi , yi )i∈N ∈
Zn is a Nash equilibrium allocation of (g, e) if there exists m ∈ M such that
(m, x) ∈ N E (g, e) and y = g (m, x), where x = (xi )i∈N and y = (yi )i∈N .
Let N A (g, e) denote the set of Nash equilibrium allocations of (g, e). A mecha-
nism g ∈ G implements P R in Nash equilibria if for each e ∈ E , N A (g, e) =
P R (e).
A profile (m∗, x∗) ∈ A is a (pure-strategy) strong (Nash) equilibrium of (g, e)
if for each T ⊆ N and each (mi , xi )i∈T ∈ (Ai )i∈T , there exists j ∈ T such that
6 The previous mechanisms such as Suh (1995), Yoshihara (1999,2000a), and Tian (2000) do not have this
property.
7 Since the coordinator also knows f and x, he can figure out that the true skill profile belongs to the
hyperplane
{
s ∈ Sn | s·x = f −1 (w)
}
. However, the exact location of the true skill profile in this
hyperplane cannot be figured out. Note that, to see which of the feasible allocations are true P R-optimal
allocations, one needs to know the information of the true skill profile.
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u j
(
x∗j , g j
(
m∗, x∗
)) ≥ u j
(
x j , g j
(







Let SN E (g, e) denote the set of strong equilibria of (g, e). An allocation z =
(xi , yi )i∈N ∈ Zn is a strong equilibrium allocation of (g, e) if there exists m ∈ M
such that (m, x) ∈ SN E (g, e) and y = g (m, x). Let SN A (g, e) denote the set
of strong equilibrium allocations of (g, e). A mechanism g ∈ G implements P R in
strong equilibria, if for each e ∈ E , SN A (g, e) = P R (e). Moreover, a mechanism
g ∈ G doubly implements P R in Nash and strong equilibria if for each e ∈ E ,
N A (g, e) = SN A (g, e) = P R (e).
2.2 Timing problem in sharing mechanisms
Before discussing our own mechanism, we should mention the timing problem of
strategy-decision in real applications of mechanisms, which is particularly relevant
to the case of production economies. Note that m and x represent different kinds of
strategic actions: m is the list of agents’ announcements of their private information,
while x is their production activity from supplying labor time. Thus, there may be
a difference between the point in time when m is announced and the time when x
is exercised. It implies that there may be at least two polar cases of time sequence
with regard to decision making: the agents may announce m before they engage in
production, or they may announce m after supplying x. The former enables each agent
i to choose his labor supply with knowledge of the announcements m, whereas the
latter enables each agent i to choose mi with knowledge of the agents’ actions x in
the production process.
Thus, we should consider at least two types of two-stage game forms: Given g ∈ G,
the first two-stage extensive game form derived from g is a feasible mechanismm◦ xg in
which Stage 1 consists of selecting m ∈ M , Stage 2 consists of selecting x ∈ [0, x¯]n ,
and then (x, g (m, x)) is the outcome. The second two-stage extensive game form
derived from g is a feasible mechanism x◦mg in which Stage 1 consists of selecting
x ∈ [0, x¯]n , Stage 2 consists of selecting m ∈ M , and then (x, g (m, x)) is the
outcome.
Given a two-stage game
(
m◦ xg , e
)
and a strategy profile m ∈ M in Stage 1, let
(
 m◦xg (m) , e
)
be the corresponding Stage 2 subgame. A strategy mapping χ :
M → [0, x¯]n is a function such that for each m ∈ M , χ (m) is a strategy profile of the
subgame
(
m◦xg (m) , e
)
. Let X be the set of such mappings. A profile (m∗,χ∗) ∈
























χ∗i (mi , m∗−i ), gi
(
mi , m




χ∗i (m), gi (m,χ∗ (m))
) ≥ ui (χi (m), gi (m,χ(m))),
8 For each T ⊆ N , #T denotes the number of agents in T . For each T ⊆ N , T c denotes the complement
of T in N .
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where χ∗i (m) (resp . χi (m)) is the i-th component of χ∗ (m) (resp . χ (m)) in Stage 2
subgame induced by the choice m in Stage 1.









be the corresponding Stage 2 subgame. A strategy mapping µ :
[0, x¯]n → M is a function such that for each x ∈ [0, x¯]n , µ (x) is a strategy profile of
the subgame
(
 x◦mg (x) , e
)
. Let M be the set of such mappings. A profile (µ∗, x∗) ∈





































µ∗ (x) , x
)) ≥ ui (xi , gi (µ (x) , x)) .









allocation z = (xi , yi )i∈N ∈ Zn is a subgame perfect equilibrium allocation
of
(
m◦ xg , e
)




such that χ (m) = x and
y = g (m,χ (m)). Let S P A
(
m◦ xg , e
)





. Given g ∈ G , m◦xg implements P R in subgame perfect




= P R (e). Given g ∈ G,  m◦xg triply
implements P R in Nash, strong, and subgame perfect equilibria if for each e ∈ E ,
N A (g, e) = SN A (g, e) = S P A
(
 m◦xg , e
)
= P R (e).9 Parallel definitions apply
to
(
 x◦mg , e
)
.
3 Implementation of the proportional solution
In the following, we impose two additional assumptions.
Assumption 1 (boundary condition): ∀i ∈ N , ∀zi ∈
◦






Assumption 2 The production function f is continuously differentiable.
We denote by f ′ (x) the derivative of f at x .
The message space M of the mechanism in this paper is defined by M ≡ Sn × Rn+
with generic element (σ , y), where σ = (σi )i∈N , in which σi denotes i’s reported
skill, and y = (yi )i∈N , in which yi denotes i’s demand for output.
9 This definition contains some abuse of language, as the implementation in Nash and strong equilibria is
achieved by the mechanism (g, e), while it is m◦xg that implements P R in subgame perfect equilibria.
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3.1 Nash and strong implementability
In this subsection, we will set aside the timing problem of sharing mechanisms and
propose a sharing mechanism as a normal form game form that implements P R in
Nash and strong equilibria. To propose our mechanism, let us introduce two feasible
sharing mechanisms, defined as follows:
• gπ ∈ G is such that for each (σ , x, y) ∈ Sn × [0, x¯]n × Rn+, each w ∈ R+, and
each i ∈ N ,
gπi (σ , x, y, w) =
{
w if (x−i ) = ∅, xi =π (x−i ) , and yi > max
{
y j | j = i
}
0 otherwise
where (x−i ) ≡
{
x j +x¯
2 | x j < x¯ for j = i
}
and π (x−i ) ≡ max (x−i ).
• gσ ∈ G is such that for each (σ , x, y) ∈ Sn × [0, x¯]n × Rn+, each w ∈ R+, and
each i ∈ N ,
gσi (σ , x, y, w) =
{
w if xi = 0, and σi > σ j for all j = i ,
0 otherwise.
The mechanism gπ ∈ G assigns all of the produced output to only one agent who
provides less than x¯ of labor time, but the maximal positive amount among those who
provide less than x¯ of labor time, and reports a maximal amount of demand for the
output, if there is such an agent at all. The mechanism gσ ∈ G also assigns all of the
produced output to only one agent who reports the highest labor skill and provides no
labor time.
Given (s,x, y) = (si , xi , yi )i∈N ∈ Sn ×Zn , let P R (s,x, y)−1 ≡ {u ∈ Un |(x, y) ∈
P R (u,s)}. If P R (s,x, y)−1 = ∅, then (x, y) should be a P R-optimal allocation
for some economy with skill profile s. Let us call such an (s,x, y) a PR- consistent




and (x, y) is an interior
allocation, then P R (s,x, y)−1 = ∅. Given (s,x, y) ∈ Sn × Zn , let N (s,x, y) ≡
{i ∈ N | ∃ (s′i , x ′i , y′i
) ∈ S × Z s.t. P R (s′i , x ′i , y′i , s−i , x−i , y−i
)−1 = ∅}. This
N (s,x, y) is the set of potential deviators under the profile (s,x, y), since any i ∈
N (s,x, y) can constitute a P R-consistent profile with the others’ fixed strategies by
switching his strategy from (si , xi , yi ). Given (s,x, y) ∈ Sn × Zn and i ∈ N (s,x, y),
let S i (s,x, y) ≡ {s′i ∈ S | ∃
(
x ′i , y′i
) ∈ Z s.t. P R(s′i , x ′i , y′i , s−i , x−i , y−i )−1 = ∅} .
Note that S i (s,x, y) is closed and bounded from below, or otherwise, S i (s,x, y) = S.
The latter case occurs if and only if there exists b ∈ R++ such that ∑k =i sk xk < b
and f is linear on [0, b].
Given (s,x, y) ∈ Sn × Zn and i ∈ N (s,x, y), let ( ŝi , x̂i , ŷi ) ∈ S × Z be defi-
ned by ŝi = arg mins′i ∈S i (s,x,y) | s′i − si |, 0 < x̂i < x¯ , and ŷi with ŷi +
∑
j =i y j =
f
(∑




j =i y j
ŷi =
∑
j =i s j x j
ŝi x̂i
. Then, P R( ŝi , x̂i , ŷi , s−i , x−i ,
y−i )−1 = ∅. Note that such (̂si , x̂i , ŷi ) is well-defined: first, ŝi is uniquely determi-
ned, since if si ∈ S i (s,x, y), then ŝi = si , whereas if si /∈ S i (s,x, y), then S i (s,x, y)
is bounded from below and ŝi = min S i (s,x, y). Second, once ŝi is uniquely deter-
mined, then the other agents’ strategies together with ŝi give us the information about
i’s potential consumption vector (̂xi , ŷi ) by the proportionality of the P R-optimal
allocation.
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We introduce g∗ ∈ G which works in each given w ∈ R+ as follows:
Let any (σ,x, y) = (σi , xi , yi )i∈N ∈ Sn × [0, x¯]n × Rn+ be given.
Rule 1 If f (∑ σk xk
) = w, then
1-1: if P R (σ,x, y)−1 = ∅, then g∗ (σ,x, y, w) = y,
1-2: if P R (σ,x, y)−1 = ∅, and N (σ,x, y) = ∅, then
1-2-1: if #N (σ,x, y) > 1, then g∗ (σ,x, y, w) = 0,
1-2-2: if N (σ,x, y) = { j} for some j ∈ N , then




0, ŷ j + ŝ j · f ′
(∑
k = j σk xk + ŝ j x̂ j
)




and g∗i (σ,x, y, w)=0 for any i = j , where P R(̂s j , x̂ j , ŷ j , σ− j , x− j , y− j )−1 =∅,
1–3: in any other case, g∗ (σ,x, y, w) = gπ (σ,x, y, w).
Rule 2 If f (∑ σk xk
) = w, then g∗ (σ,x, y, w) = gσ (σ,x, y, w).
First, g∗ computes the expected output f (∑ σk xk
)
from the data (σ,x, y) and com-
pares this with the real output w. In the case where these two values coincide, if
(σ,x, y) is P R -consistent, then g∗ gives the agents their desired y under Rule 1–1;
if (σ,x, y) is not P R-consistent, and there exists at least one potential deviator, say
j , then g∗ gives him at most a share of outcome available in the budget set with the
supporting price ŝ j · f ′
(∑
k = j σk xk + ŝ j x̂ j
)
, while g∗ gives nothing to any other
agents under Rule 1–2; for any other case, g∗ applies gπ under Rule 1–3. Finally, if
f (∑ σk xk
)
and w are different, then g∗ applies gσ under Rule 2.
It is easy to see that g∗ is forthright (Saijo et al. 1996) and satisfies best response
property (Jackson et al. 1994). Moreover, g∗ is a quantity type, and so self-relevant
(Hurwicz 1960). It is also easy to check that g∗ is feasible.
Let us briefly explain how g∗ induces true information about skills. This g∗ has
to distribute the total output f (∑ sk xk
)
according to (σ,x, y), where (sk)k∈N stands
for the true skill profile and the coordinator cannot know whether σ = s or not. If
f (∑ σk xk
) = f (∑ sk xk
)
, however, then clearly σ = s, and there is at least one
agent, say j ∈ N , such that σ j = s j and x j > 0. Then, this agent is definitely
punished under Rule 2. Next, consider the case where f (∑ σk xk
) = f (∑ sk xk
)
but σ = s. Then, there are either at least two agents i, j ∈ N such that σi = si ,
σ j = s j , xi > 0, and x j > 0, or else there exists an agent j ∈ N such that σ j = s j
and x j = 0 . If the latter case is applied, then the agents such as j will be punished
under Rule 1–2 or Rule 1–3. If the former case is applied, then one of the agents,
j ∈ N , with σ j = s j can induce Rule 2 by switching from x j > 0 to x ′j = 0,
together with announcing a higher number σ ′j = s j than any other σ− j . Thus, this
case may not correspond to an equilibrium. The following lemma actually confirms
this insight:
Lemma 1 Let g∗ ∈ G be given. Given (u,s) ∈ E , let (σ , x, y) ∈ Sn ×[0, x¯]n ×Rn+ be
a Nash equilibrium of (g∗, u,s) such that f (∑ σk xk
) = f (∑ sk xk
)
. Then, it follows
that for all i ∈ N with xi > 0, σi = si .
Now, we examine the performance of g∗.
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Theorem 1 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Now the mechanism g∗ implements P R
in Nash and strong equilibria.
Note that g∗ works even in economies of two agents.
3.2 Implementation of the proportional solution with the timing problem
Because of the timing problem discussed in Sect. 2.2, g∗ may be played as (σ, y)◦xg∗
or 
x◦(σ, y)
g∗ . In this situation, the coordinator may not know in advance the infor-
mation structure of the two-stage game induced by (σ, y)◦xg∗ or x◦(σ, y)g∗ , even if the
coordinator has control over the number of stages in the mechanism: this information
structure among agents may be characterized as perfect information, or as complete
but imperfect information about Stage 1. If the game is played as one with perfect
information (resp. complete but imperfect information), we should consider subgame-
perfect equilibria (resp. Nash equilibria) in the two-stage game. For instance, let us
assume that the stage of announcing (σ , y) to the coordinator is in advance of pro-
duction, in which x is supplied, and the information (σ , y) is not made public by
the coordinator until the end of the production process. If this is effectively enforced,
then the coordinator may be concerned with Nash and strong implementation only.
Such a scenario implicitly assumes that the coordinator can effectively obstruct any
private communication regarding (σ , y) among agents until the end of the production
process. However, the coordinator may not be able to effectively wield this power,
and agents could privately communicate with each other regarding (σ , y). This is one
case that the coordinator cannot control the information structure among agents. In
such a situation, the double implementability by (σ, y)◦xg∗ (resp.  x◦(σ, y)g∗ ) in Nash and
subgame-perfect equilibria would be strongly attractive, since it keeps the desirable
performance of the mechanism without relying on the information structure among
agents:
Theorem 2 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Now the mechanism (σ, y)◦xg∗ doubly
implements P R in Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria.
Theorem 3 Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Now the mechanism x◦(σ, y)g∗ doubly
implements P R in Nash and subgame-perfect equilibria.
By the three theorems discussed above, we can summarize as follows:
Corollary Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Now both of the mechanisms (σ, y)◦xg∗
and x◦(σ, y)g∗ respectively triply implement P R in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong
equilibria.
This result implies that g∗ implements P R even if it permits each agent various kinds
of freedom: the agent may choose freely his own supply of labor time; the agent is
permitted to overstate his labor skill; the agent can behave unilaterally or coalitionally;
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Table 1 Performance of mechanisms implementing solutions for the tragedy of commons
Suh Yoshihara Yoshihara Kaplan- Tian Corchon- Our
(1995) (1999) (2000) Wettstein (2000) Puy mechanism
(2000) (2002)
Equilibrium NA NA NA SPA NA NA NA
notions* SNA SNA SNA SNA SNA
UNA UNA SPA
# of goods 2 2 2 or more 2 2 or more 2 2








No No No No Yes No Yes
Labor sovereignty No No No No No No Yes
Feasibility Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Self-relevancy No Yes Yes No No No Yes
Best response
property
No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Forthrightness No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Balancedness No Yes Yes No No Yes No
Continuity No No No No Yes No No
* NA, SNA, UNA, and SPA mean Nash implementability, strong Nash implementability, undominated Nash
implementability, and subgame-perfect implementability respectively
and the agent can behave strong-rationally, as in the subgame-perfect response, or
weak-rationally, as in the Nash-like response.10
4 Concluding remarks
We have proposed a feasible sharing mechanism that triply implements the propor-
tional solution in Nash, subgame-perfect, and strong equilibria, even when agents
can understate or overstate their labor skills. The performance of our mechanism is
summarized in Table 1, which provides a comparison with other relevant mechanisms.
10 Let us point out this more precisely. Note that intermediate situations may happen where some agents
behave unilaterally, and others coalitionally. For instance, let H be a subset of the power set of N , which
is the set of admissible coalitions, and consider an equilibrium relative to H, i.e., message-action profiles
upon which no coalition in H can improve. When H stands for the set of all singletons, the equilibrium
relative to H becomes the Nash equilibrium, while it becomes the strong equilibrium in case H is the set of
all coalitions. The problem is that the mechanism coordinator may not expect what equilibrium notions the
agents choose in the play of the game, since he has no information about the structure of H. However, once
a doubly-implementing mechanism is provided, such a difficulty is resolved, which gives us a motivation
for the double implementation in Nash and strong equilibria.
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As revealed in Table 1, our mechanism has two undesirable features. First, it lacks
continuity. Second, the mechanism fails to meet balancedness or nonwastefulness.
One reason of the second undesirability is that the mechanism permits agents to both
overstate and understate their labor skills. Thus, it is difficult to find the deviator
when only aggregate information
( f (∑ σk xk
)
and f (∑ sk xk
))
is available. The-
refore, the mechanism basically punishes all agents when there is a deviator. The
other reason is that this mechanism is characterized by labor sovereignty. The labor
sovereignty mechanism should accept a profile of the agents’ choice of labor time
as an outcome, even when it may constitute a nondesirable allocation. Thus, if the
mechanism needs to punish potential deviators, this is only possible by reducing
their share of output, which leads to the violation of balancedness. We surmise that
there may be a trade-off between labor sovereignty and balancedness. However, it
remains an open question whether or not there exists a mechanism that satisfies both
labor sovereignty and balancedness, and at the same time implements the proportional
solution.
5 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1 Suppose there exists j ∈ N with σ j = s j and x j > 0. Let NL (σ )
be the set of such j . Since f (∑ σk xk
) = f (∑ sk xk
)
, NL (σ ) is not a singleton.
Moreover, for each j ∈ NL (σ ), y′j = f
(∑
i = j si xi
)
> 0 by σ ′j > max {σi | i = j}





















i∈NL (σ )\{ j}
si xi +
∑









⎝s j x j +
∑











⎝s j x j +
∑












s j x j +
∑










g∗j (σ , x, y) .
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If there exists j ∈ NL (s) such that y′j > y j , then j has an incentive to switch from
x j to x ′j = 0 and report σ ′j > max {σi | i = j}. If y′j = y j for each j ∈ NL (σ ), then
each j ∈ NL (σ ) has an incentive to switch from x j to x ′j = 0, since u j (x ′j , y′j ) =
u j (0, y j ) > u j (x j , y j ) by the strict monotonicity of utility functions. Thus, in any
case, it contradicts the fact that (σ , x, y) is a Nash equilibrium. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 1 (1) Show P R (u, s) ⊆ N A (g∗, u,s) for each (u,s) ∈ E . Let
z = (x, y) ∈ P R (u, s). If the strategy profile is (s, x, y) ∈ Sn × [0, x¯]n × Rn+,
then g∗ (s, x, y) = y by Rule 1–1. Since s  0 and z is an efficient proportional
allocation, Assumption 1 implies x  0 and g∗i (s, x, y) > 0 for each i ∈ N . Suppose




σ ′j , x ′j , y′j
)
∈ S × [0, x¯] × R+.
Note first that the deviation cannot induce Rule 1–3. If the deviation results in Rule
1–2–1, then g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , s− j , x− j , y− j
)
= 0. If the deviation induces Rule 2, then
x ′j > 0. Hence, g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , s− j , x− j , y− j
)
= 0 under Rule 2.
If the deviation induces Rule 1–2–2 with σ ′j = s j , then x ′j = 0. Thus,
g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , s− j , x− j , y− j
)
≤ ŷ j − ŝ j x̂ j · f ′
(∑




ŝ j , x̂ j , ŷ j
) ∈ S×[0, x¯]×R+ such that P R
(
ŝ j , x̂ j , ŷ j , s− j , x− j , y− j
)−1 = ∅. Sup-
pose f
(∑




i = j si xi + s j x j
)
. Since P R (s, x, y)−1 = ∅,
f
(∑
i = j si xi +̂s j x̂ j
)
∑
i = j si xi +̂s j x̂ j =
∑
i = j yi∑
i = j si xi
= f
(∑
i = j si xi +s j x j
)
∑
i = j si xi +s j x j . Since f is concave, f must be




i = j si xi + ŝ j x̂ j ,
∑
i = j si xi + s j x j
}]
. Hence,
ŷ j − ŝ j x̂ j · f ′
(∑
i = j si xi + ŝ j x̂ j
)
= 0. Thus, g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , s− j , x− j , y− j
)
≤ 0.
Next, suppose that f
(∑




i = j si xi + s j x j
)
. This implies
ŝ j x̂ j = s j x j and ŷ j = y j . Thus, g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , s− j , x− j , y− j
)
≤ ŷ j − ŝ j x̂ j ·
f ′
(∑
i = j si xi + ŝ j x̂ j
)





Consider the case where the deviation induces Rule 1–2–2 with σ ′j = s j . Since
f
(∑
i = j si xi +s j x̂ j
)
∑
i = j si xi +s j x̂ j =
∑
i = j yi∑
i = j si xi
= f
(∑
i = j si xi +s j x j
)
∑












s, x ′j , x− j , y′j , y− j
)
≤





x ′j − x j
)
.
Next, if the deviation induces Rule 1–1, then σ ′j = s j . This is because σ ′j = s j imp-
lies x ′j = 0 under Rule 1-1, which contradicts P R
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , s− j , x− j , y− j
)−1 =
∅ by Assumption 1. However, if the deviation induces Rule 1–1 with σ ′j = s j , then











s, x ′j , x− j , y′j , y− j
)





x ′j − x j
)
. In summary, by
Assumption 1 and Pareto efficiency of z, no agent has an incentive to deviate from
(s, x, y).
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(2) Show N A(g∗, u,s) ⊆ P R (u, s) for each (u, s) ∈ E . Let (σ,x, y) ∈
N E (g∗, u,s).
Suppose that (σ,x, y) corresponds to Rule 2. Let N 0 (x) ≡ {i ∈ N | xi = 0}.
If N 0 (x) = ∅, then g∗i (σ,x, y) = 0 for all i ∈ N . Then, there exists j ∈ N
such that
∑
i = j σi xi =
∑
i = j si xi . Thus, g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
> 0 with
σ ′j > max {σi | i ∈ N } and x ′j = 0 under Rule 2. If #N 0 (x) ≥ 2, then for any
j ∈ N 0 (x), g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
= f (∑ sk xk
)
by x ′j = 0 and σ ′j >
max {σi | i = j} under Rule 2. If #N 0 (x) = 1 and #N\N 0 (x) ≥ 2, then there exists
j ∈ N\N 0 (x) such that ∑i∈N\(N 0(x)∪{ j}) σi xi =
∑
i∈N\(N 0(x)∪{ j}) si xi . Thus,
g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
> 0 by σ ′j > max {σi | i ∈ N } and x ′j = 0 under
Rule 2. If N 0 (x) = {i} and N\N 0 (x) = { j}, then g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
>




s j x ′j
)}
under Rule 1–3. In summary,
no profile of strategies can constitute a Nash equilibrium in Rule 2.
Suppose that (σ,x, y) corresponds to Rule 1–3. Then, g∗j (σ,x, y) = 0 for some
j ∈ N . If either x j = 0 or σ j = s j , then g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
> 0








s j x ′j
)
, max {yi | i = j}
}
under
Rule 1–3. If x j > 0 and σ j = s j , then g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
> 0 by
σ ′j > max {σi | i ∈ N } and x ′j = 0 under Rule 2.
Suppose that (σ,x, y) corresponds to Rule 1–2–1. Then, g∗i (σ,x, y) = 0 for each
i ∈ N . Note x j = 0 for some j ∈ N implies N (σ,x, y) = { j} or N (σ,x, y) = ∅.
Hence x  0. For each j ∈ N with σ j = s j , g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
> 0 by








s j x ′j
)
, max {yi | i = j}
}
under Rule 1–3
or Rule 1–2–2. Also, for each j ∈ N with σ j =s j , g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
>0
by σ ′j > max {σi | i ∈ N } and x ′j = 0 under Rule 2.
Suppose that (σ,x, y) corresponds to Rule 1–2–2. Then, N\N (σ,x, y) = ∅, and
xi > 0 and g∗i (σ,x, y) = 0 for each i ∈ N\N (σ,x, y). For each j ∈ N\N (σ,x, y)
with σ j = s j , g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)









s j x ′j
)
, max {yi | i = j}
}
under Rule 1–3. Also, for any j ∈
N\N (σ,x, y) with σ j = s j , g∗j
(
σ ′j , x ′j , y′j , σ− j , x− j , y− j
)
> 0 by σ ′j >
max {σi | i ∈ N } and x ′j = 0 under Rule 2.
Thus, (σ,x, y) corresponds to Rule 1–1. Then, g∗ (σ , x, y) = y, which implies




for each i ∈ N . By Assumption 1, x  0.
Moreover, f (∑ σk xk
) = f (∑ sk xk
)
. Therefore, by Lemma 1, σ = s. Since
(σ,x, y) ∈ N E (g∗, u,s), for each i ∈ N and each (σ ′i , x ′i , y′i
) ∈ S × [0, x¯] × R+,
ui
(
xi , g∗i (σ,x, y)
) ≥ ui
(
x ′i , g∗i
(
σ ′i , x ′i , y′i , σ−i , x−i , y−i
))
. For each i ∈ N , g∗i(
σ ′i , x ′i , y′i , σ−i , x−i , y−i
) ≤ yi + si · f ′
(∑
sk xk
) · (x ′i − xi
)
by σ ′i = si and y′i = 0
under Rule 1–2–2. Thus, (x, y) is Pareto efficient for (u, s), so that (x, y) ∈ P R (u, s).
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(3) Show SN A (g∗, e) = N A (g∗, e) for each e ∈ E . By definition, SN A (g∗, e) ⊆
N A (g∗, e). Suppose SN A (g∗, e)  N A (g∗, e). Then, there exists (σ,x, y)
∈ N E (g∗, e) such that for some T  N and some (σ ′i , x ′i , y′i
)
i∈T ∈ S#T × [0, x¯]#T ×
R
#T+ , and each j ∈ T ,
u j
(




x ′j , g∗j
((
σ ′i , x ′i , y′i
)
i∈T , (σl , xl , yl)l∈N\T
))
.
Since (σ , x, y) ∈ N E (g∗, e) corresponds to Rule 1–1 as shown above, (σ , x, y) is
PR-consistent, so that x  0 under Assumption 1. Hence, σ = s by Lemma 1. Note
also that T = N is eliminated by Pareto efficiency of N A (g∗, e). By construction
of g∗, there is at most one agent who has a positive share of output under Rules 1–2–1,
1–2–2, 1–3, and 2. Since g∗i (s, x, y)>0 for all i ∈ N ,
((
σ ′i , x ′i , y′i
)
i∈T , (sl , xl , yl)l∈N\T
)









, and we obtain
g∗j
((
σ ′i , x ′i , y′i
)
i∈T , (sl , xl , yl)l∈N\T






x ′j − x j
)
for some j ∈ T . Thus, by Pareto efficiency of (x, g∗ (s, x, y)), N A (g∗, e) =
SN A (g∗, e). unionsq
Proof of Theorem 2 Since N A (g∗, e) = P R (e) for each e ∈ E , we have only to






for each e ∈ E . First, we show that in every Stage
2-subgame, there exists a Nash equilibrium. Let a strategy mapping χ∗ : Sn ×Rn+ →




g∗ (σ , y) , e
)
:



















Note g∗ (σ ,χ∗ (σ , y) , y) corresponds to Rule 1–3. To simplify the notation, let us
denote x∗ = χ∗ (σ , y) in the following discussion.
Suppose that i ∈ N switches from x∗i to x ′i . Note that this deviation does not induce
Rule 1–1. If x ′i induces Rule 1–2–2, then g∗i
(
σ , x∗′i , x∗−i , y
) ≤ g∗i (σ , x∗, y), because




. If x ′i induces Rule 2, then x ′i > 0, so that g∗i
(
σ , x ′i , x∗−i , y
) =
0. If x ′i induces Rule 1–3, then g∗i
(
σ , x ′i , x∗−i , y
) ≤ g∗i (σ , x∗, y). To see this, let
us assume that an agent, say j , has a positive output in g∗ (σ , x∗, y). Then, y j >
max {yk | k = j}. Since x∗ =
(
x
2 , 0− j
)















g∗ (σ , y) , e
)
. If i = j , then g∗i
(
σ , x ′i , x∗−i , y
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Now, we will demonstrate that for each e = (u,s) ∈ E , if ẑ = (̂x ,̂ y) ∈ P R (e),
then there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium whose corresponding outcome is ẑ.







(1) In Stage 1, (σ , y) = (s, ŷ).
(2) In Stage 2, χ : Sn × Rn+ → [0, x¯]n is given as follows:
(2–1): if (σ , y) = (s, ŷ) in Stage 1, then χ (σ , y) = x̂;
(2–2): if (σ , y) =
((




y′j , ŷ− j
))
is such that s′j = s j , y′j = ŷ j , and for
each i = j , y′j ≥ yi in Stage 1, then for this j ∈ N ,




x ′j , g∗j
(
s, x ′j , x̂− j , y′j , ŷ− j
))
and for all i = j , χi (σ , y) = x̂i ;





g∗ (σ , y) , e
)




g∗ (σ , y) , e
)
. This is because (̂x, ŷ) ∈ N A (g∗, e) by Theorem 1. Also, by




g∗ (σ , y) , e
)






g∗ (σ , y) , e
)
corresponds to (2-2). Then, g∗ (σ ,χ (σ , y) , y)
corresponds to Rule 1–1 or Rule 1–2, since j ∈ N
(





s, x ′j , x̂− j , y′j , ŷ− j
)−1 = ∅ for any x ′j ∈ [0, x¯]. If g∗ (σ ,χ (σ , y) , y) corres-






i = j si x̂i + s j x ′j
}]
,
which implies the Pareto efficiency of
((




y′j , ŷ− j
))





g∗ (σ , y) , e
)
. If g∗ (σ ,χ (σ , y) , y) corresponds to Rule 1–2, then




g∗ (σ , y) , e
)
. This is because
N
(
s, 0, x̂− j , y′j , ŷ− j
)
= { j}, and so g∗ (σ ,χ (σ , y) , y) corresponds to Rule 1–2–2.
For any other i = j , any deviation from x̂i to x ′i results in g∗i
(
σ , x ′i ,χ−i (σ , y) , y
) =




g∗ (σ , y) , e
)
.



















in Stage 1. Then by (2–2) and (2–3), g∗j
(
s′j , s− j ,χ
(










x ′j − x̂ j
)
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Proof of Theorem 3 Since N A (g∗, e) = P R (e) for each e ∈ E , we have only to show






. First, we will show that in every Stage 2-subgame,
there is a Nash equilibrium.





g∗ (x) , e
)
, µ∗ (x) = (σ ∗, y∗), where for each i ∈ N :
(
σ ∗i , y∗i
) =
{
(si , 0) if xi = π (x−i )
(si , f (si xi ) + 1) otherwise .




σ ′i , y′i
)
. Note that g∗ (σ ∗, x, y∗)
corresponds to Rule 1–3. Thus, i cannot induce Rule 1–1 by changing his stra-
tegy. If
(
σ ′i , y′i
)
induces Rule 1–2–2, then g∗i
(
σ ′i , σ ∗−i , x, y′i , y∗−i
) = 0, because




σ ′i , y′i
)
induces Rule 2 , then xi > 0, which implies
g∗i
(
σ ′i , σ ∗−i , x, y′i , y∗−i
) = 0. If (σ ′i , y′i
)
induces Rule 1–3, then g∗i
(
σ ′i , σ ∗−i , x,
y′i , y∗−i
) ≤ g∗i (σ ∗, x, y∗ ), since whether xi = π (x−i ) or not is already fixed in




g∗ (x) , e
)
.
Now, we will show that if ẑ = (̂x ,̂ y) ∈ P R (e), then there exists a subgame-perfect








(1) In Stage 1, each i ∈ N supplies x̂i > 0.
(2) In Stage 2, µ : [0, x¯]n → Sn × Rn+ is given as follows:
(2–1): if x = x̂ in Stage 1, then µ (x) = (s,̂ y);
(2–2): if x =
(
x ′j , x̂− j
)
 0, where x ′j = x̂ j in Stage 1, then
for j ∈ N , µ j (x) =
(
s j , f
(





for all i = j , µi (x) =
{
(si , ŷi ) if xi = π (x−i )(
si , f
(∑
k = j sk x̂k + s j x ′j
))
otherwise ;





g∗ (x) , e
)




g∗ (x) , e
)
. This is because (̂x, ŷ) ∈ N A (g∗, e) by Theorem 1. Also, by the




g∗ (x) , e
)





g∗ (x) , e
)





. First, if s′h = sh , then g∗h
(
s′h, y′h,µ−h (x) , x
) = 0 under Rule 2.
Secondly, consider the following two cases:
(i) For all i = j , xi = π (x−i ). Then, g∗ (µ (x) , x) corresponds to Rule 1–2–2. If
h = j and (s′h, y′h
)
induces Rule 1–2–2 or Rule 1–3, then g∗h
(
s′h, y′h,µ−h (x) , x
) = 0.
Note if h = j , then (s′h, y′h
)
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Rule 1–2–2 or Rule 1–1, then g∗h
(
s′h, y′h,µ−h (x) , x




x ′h − x̂h
)
. Note if h = j , then (s′h, y′h
)





g∗ (x) , e
)
.









induces Rule 1–2–2, this





s′h, y′h,µ−h (x) , x
) = 0. If (s′h, y′h
)
induces Rule 1–3, then g∗h
(
s′h, y′h,µ−h (x) , x
)





g∗ (x) , e
)
.














g∗ (µ (̂x) , x̂) = g∗ (s, x̂, ŷ) = ŷ. Suppose that j ∈ N deviates from x̂ j to x ′j = x̂ j in








x ′j , x̂− j
))









x ′j , x̂− j
))





x ′j − x̂ j
)
. Thus,
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